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THE REAL THING: SPECIAL ANTITRUST
TREATMENT FOR THE SOFT DRINK
INDUSTRY
On July 9, 1980, President Carter signed into law the Soft Drink Inter-
brand Competition Act, a law "to clarify the circumstances under which
territorial provisions in licenses to manufacture, distribute, and sell trade-
marked soft drink products are lawful under the antitrust laws."' Enact-
ment of the bill2 concluded eight years3 of legislative attempts to clarify
1. Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act, Pub. L. No. 96-308, §§ 1-5, 96 Stat. 939
(1980).
SEC. 2. Nothing contained in any antitrust law shall render unlawful the inclu-
sion and enforcement in any trademark licensing contract or agreement, pursuant
to which the licensee engages in the manufacture (including manufacture by a sub-
licensee, agent, or subcontractor), distribution, and sale of a trademarked soft
drink product, of provisions granting the licensee the sole and exclusive right to
manufacture, distribute, and sell such product in a defined geographic area or lim-
iting the licensee, directly or indirectly, to the manufacture, distribution, and sale
of such product only for ultimate resale to consumers within a defined geographic
area: Provided, That such product is in substantial and effective competition with
other products of the same general class in the relevant market or markets.
SEC. 3. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to legalize the enforcement of
provisions described in section 2 of this Act in trademark licensing contracts or
agreements described in that section by means of price fixing agreements, horizon-
tal restraints of trade, or group boycotts, if such agreements, restraints, or boycotts
would otherwise be unlawful.
SEC. 4. In the case of any proceeding instituted by the United States described
in subsection (i) of section 5 of the Clayton Act (relating to suspension of the stat-
ute of limitations on the institution of proceedings by the United States) (15
U.S.C. 16(i)) which is pending on the date of enactment of this Act, that subsection
shall not apply with respect to any right of action referred to in that subsection
based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in that proceeding consist-
ing of the existence or enforcement of any provision described in section 2 of this
Act in any trademarked licensing contract or agreement described in that section.
SEC. 5. As used in this Act, the term "antitrust law" means the Sherman Act (15
U.S.C. §§ I et seq.), the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 12 et seq.), and the Federal
Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq.).
2. Both houses of Congress voted overwhelmingly in favor of the legislation. The Sen-
ate passed S. 598 by a vote of 89-3. 126 CONG. REC. S5437 (daily ed. May 15, 1980). The
House passed H.R. 3567 by a vote of 77-34. 126 CONG. REC. H5548 (daily ed. June 24,
1980). Rep. Hall, the original sponsor of H.R. 3567, was joined by over 300 of his colleagues
as cosponsors. After hearings were held on H.R. 3567, the cosponsors moved to discharge
the Judiciary Committee from further consideration of the bill. The requisite number of
members of the House signed the discharge petition which resulted in the bill being sched-
uled for immediate floor action despite lack of Judiciary Committee approval. In the
meantime, however, the Committee acted on the bill, reporting it out with amendments.
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the application of the antitrust laws to the exclusive territorial restraints
used in the soft drink industry.'
Generally, the antitrust laws5 are intended to foster competition by pro-
scribing anticompetitive restraints of trade. To determine whether re-
straints are unlawfully anticompetitive, courts have used either a rule of
reason analysis or a per se approach. The rule of reason requires judicial
examination of the reasonableness of the restraint in question in light of all
relevant circumstances. 6 In contrast, the per se analysis presumes that cer-
tain types of restraints of trade are illegal without regard to their reasona-
bleness under the particular circumstances.
7
The soft drink industry operates under a distribution system that in-
cludes vertical territorial restraints. Under this system, the franchisor allo-
cates an area to which the bottler is limited in distributing the trademarked
soft drinks. Because the agreement to restrict distribution to a designated
area is made between parties at two different levels of the market structure
(manufacturing and distribution), the restraint is considered vertical. At
various times, vertical restraints have been held to be unlawfully anticom-
petitive, depending on whether a rule of reason or a per se approach was
applied. In Continental T V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. ,' the Supreme
Court made it clear that the rule of reason would apply in determining the
legality of vertical restraints. By passing the Soft Drink Interbrand Com-
The Committee's action thus vitiated the attempt to discharge the Committee from authority
to act. In the Senate, Senators Bayh and Cochran were the primary sponsors of S. 598 and
over 70 other Senators joined them as cosponsors.
3. See S. REP. No. 645, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980). In 1973, the Senate passed by
voice vote a bill similar to the Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act. See 119 CONG. REC.
S 18,947 (daily ed. June 11, 1973). See also note 26 infra.
4. The exclusive territorial allocation system is utilized throughout the industry.
Under this system, a soft drink manufacturer licenses a distributor to bottle the trademarked
soft drink in a designated territory. The manufacturer agrees to grant that bottler exclusive
sale, distribution, and production rights within the territory and the bottler agrees to sell the
product only within the territory.
5. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal." Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to
the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any
part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
6. See notes 53-57 and accompanying text infra.
7. See notes 57-61 and accompanying text infra.
8. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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petition Act, Congress attempted to clarify further the application of the
antitrust laws to the specific vertical restraints used in the soft drink indus-
try.
Although the legislative history suggests that the Act codifies the rule of
reason articulated in Sylvania,9 the Act actually sets forth a new standard,
one requiring "substantial and effective" interbrand competition, for scru-
tinizing territorial agreements in the soft drink industry.'" By mandating a
standard which differs from the established rule of reason, Congress has
singled out the soft drink industry for unique treatment under the antitrust
laws but has failed to give guidance as to what are the precise require-
ments of the new statute.
I. THE SOFT DRINK INDUSTRY
The soft drink industry operates on a franchise system in which a
franchisor, such as the Coca-Cola Company, provides flavoring concen-
trate or syrup to franchisee bottlers. The bottlers then manufacture, sell,
and distribute both bottled and canned soft drinks." There are about
1,700 bottling companies nationwide operating approximately 2,000 bot-
tling plants. 12 Although many of the bottlers are small, local companies,
the syrup manufacturers themselves as well as other large national corpo-
rations own a number of bottling franchises.' 3 The soft drink industry is
financially successful' a and is generally characterized as an oligopoly be-
cause the four largest syrup manufacturers, Coca-Cola, Pepsico, Seven-
Up, and Dr. Pepper, control over sixty-eight percent of all soft drink
sales. '
5
9. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1118, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980).
10. Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act, Pub. L. No. 96-308, § 1, 96 Stat. 939 (1980).
11. See generally NATIONAL SOFT DRINK ASSOCIATION, A STUDY OF THE SOFT DRINK
BOTTLING AND CANNING INDUSTRY AND THE IMPACT OF THE FTC COMPLAINT ON THE
INDUSTRY'S FUTURE (July 7, 1972) (prepared by Cresap, McCormick and Paget, Inc.) [here-
inafter cited as SOFT DRINK INDUSTRY STUDY].
12. See S. REP. No. 645, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980); 12 NAT'L J. 1014 (June 21, 1980).
13. In his testimony, Mark Silbergeld, Director of the Consumers Union, listed several
large companies, including Liggett & Myers, General Tire & Rubber, and Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox, as holding soft drink franchises. Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act: Hearings
on S. 598 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly and Business Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 213 (1979) [hereinafter cited as S. 598 Hear-
ings] (testimony of Mark Silbergeld).
14. William S. Comanor, former Director of the Bureau of Economics of the Federal
Trade Commission, noted that while the average manufacturer's rate of return over the 15-
year period between 1963-1977 was 12%, the average rate of return among leading soft drink
manufacturers was 21%. S. 598 Hearings, supra note 13, at 92 (testimony of William Coma-
nor).
15. See Lamer, The Economics of Territorial Restrictions in the Soft Drink Industry, 22
1980]
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The distribution system used throughout the industry 6 grants bottlers
the exclusive right to sell a specific brand in their designated territories and
prohibits bottlers from selling outside their areas. 7 Bottlers are not, how-
ever, precluded from distributing more than one trademarked brand
within their given territories, and, in fact, bottlers commonly "piggyback"
franchises for one or more additional trademarked brands.
18
The rationale for the territorial arrangements used in the industry is
that, theoretically, they enable bottlers to provide services to a wide variety
of customers within their areas because they face no pressure from compet-
ing bottlers of the same brand within that region.' 9 If a bottler has no
intrabrand competition, he is more likely to pursue every sales opportunity
within his territory. Encouraging this effective market penetration would
then enhance a bottler's ability to compete against bottlers of other
brands.2° Because the territorial agreements limit competition, their legal-
ity under the antitrust laws has been questioned. Recently, however, Con-
gress responded to the questions by outlining criteria for determining the
legality of territorial restraints in the soft drink industry.
II. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Legislation to remove the soft drink industry from the coverage of pre-
vailing antitrust standards was first introduced in 1972,2I one year after the
ANTITRUST BULL. 145, 147 (1977); Mongoven, Advertising as a Barrier to Entry: Structure
and Performance in the Soft-Drink Industry, 8 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 93, 94-95 (1976).
16. The territorial restrictions used in the soft drink industry originate from the early
days of soft drink distribution when the outlook for successfully distributing soft drinks was
uncertain. See Lamer, supra note 15, at 151-53.
17. This arrangement between the trademark-owning company and the bottlers consti-
tutes a system of vertical restraints because the agreements are made between persons on
different distribution levels. See note 63 infra.
18. See Katz, Competition in the Soft Drink Industry, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 263, 266
(1979). For a description of piggybacking and its prevalence in the industry, see note 36
infra.
19. S. 598 Hearings, supra note 13, at 2 (statement by Senator Birch Bayh).
20. In an early case involving the Coca-Cola trademark, Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Coca-Cola Co., 269 F. 796 (D. Del. 1920), the court found the increase in the ability of a
franchise to build its business on a solid foundation within its territory to be sufficiently
valuable to justify the territorial restrictions. Id. at 808-10.
21. In 1972, the prevailing antitrust precedent with respect to vertical restraints was
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), where the Court set forth aper
se approach for certain vertical territorial restraints.The Court in Schwinn held that in cases
where a manufacturer has parted with dominion of his product, it is illegal per se for that
manufacturer to impose territorial or other restrictions on distributors or retailers. For a
discussion of Schwinn, see notes 66-70 infra.
The effect of the Schwinn rule on the bottling industry was explained by the late Senator
Hart in his opening statement for the hearings on Exclusive Territorial Allocation legislation
[Vol. 30:131
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Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found the industry's use of territorial
arrangements to be anticompetitive and in violation of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. The FTC had issued complaints charging
Coca-Cola Company and Pepsico" with frustrating and eliminating com-
petition in the distribution and sale of soft drinks by the use of territorial
arrangements. The soft drink industry turned to Congress, citing the eco-
nomic consequences that the FTC action would have for small, local bot-
tlers. 3 Consequently, legislation was introduced to permit territorial
restrictions in the industry24 as long as there was "free and open" competi-
tion among different products and their vendors. 25 In varying terms, sub-
by the Subcommittee on Antitrust & Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Senator
Hart noted the concern of bottlers in light of prevailing law, categorizing the law "as making
exclusive territorial arrangements highly vulnerable to attack by the antitrust enforcement
agencies." Exclusive Territorial Allocation Regulation: Hearings on S. 3040, S 3116, S. 3133,
S. 3145 & S. 3587, Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 565 (1972).
22. Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978); Pepsico, Inc., 91 F.T.C. 680 (1978).
23. The potential failure of small businesses in the soft drink industry as a result of the
FTC order has been one of the arguments most frequently expressed by proponents of the
soft drink legislation. Chain supermarkets use a central warehouse system to which goods
are delivered and from which they distribute products to the individual stores in the chain.
Soft drink bottlers, however, deliver directly to the stores in their territories rather than to
central warehouses. See SOFT DRINK INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 11. If the territorial
arrangements were discontinued, the supermarket chains would presumably contract with
one bottler to deliver all its soft drinks to the central warehouse rather than continuing with
the current system in which each store contracts separately with the bottler in its territory.
Small bottlers fear that a large bottler, located closer to a supermarket chain's warehouse,
would be awarded the lucrative account. The accounts of other bottlers would then be
limited to the less lucrative small stores, gas stations, etc. See SOFT DRINK INDUSTRY
STUDY, supra note 11, at 39. "Without exclusive territories, many small bottlers like myself
believe that we would lose the 25 to 30 percent of our business we do with chainstores
... "" S. 598 Hearings, supra note 13, at 14 (statement of Peter Moore, Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Co. of Bend, Oregon). See also S. 3040 Hearings, supra note 21, at 621-23 (prepared state-
ment of National Soft Drink Association). Critics of the bills have cited the positive local
impact of the legislation and attributed the bills' congressional support to local political
pressure. See 12 NAT'L J., 1013 (June 21, 1980).
24. Some legislation offered on behalf of the soft drink industry would also have ap-
plied to food retailers. In United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), the
Court held that the territorial agreements made by Topco, a cooperative food distribution
association composed of 25 supermarket chains, were illegal per se. The Court determined
that the agreements, made "between competitors at the same level of the market structure,"
were horizontal restraints and thus per se illegal under § I of the Sherman Act. Id. at 608.
The Court's adverse ruling in Topco prompted food retailers to seek legislative relief from
the application of certain antitrust laws. The legislative consideration of the antitrust treat-
ment for food retailers is, however, beyond the scope of this Comment. For a general dis-
cussion of this area see Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1241
(1972); 22 CATH. U.L. REV. 684 (1973).
25. S. 3133 and similar bills of the 92d Congress sanctioned exclusive territorial
franchise arrangements as long as otherwise "free and open" competition existed. Former
1980]
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sequent bills26 embraced the same original goal - to exempt the bottlers'
arrangements from per se scrutiny by the courts27 and to provide a new
test for review that would have sanctioned the absence of intrabrand28
competition caused by the territorial arrangements.29 While representa-
tives of the bottling industry categorized the legislation as "policy gui-
dance" from Congress in response to confusing Supreme Court rulings,3"
Department of Justice spokesmen consistently referred to the bills as pro-
viding unjustified antitrust immunity for soft drink bottlers.3' Because of
Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Kauper described the standard of "free and open"
competition as requiring only that there be similar commodities produced by others which
compete on the market with the product in question without being hindered by unlawful
trade restraints. S 3040 Hearings, supra note 21, at 565.
26. Beginning in the 92d Congress, dozens of bills were introduced. They each pro-
posed to permit territorial restraints as long as some other antitrust test would be met. See,
e.g., S. 3133, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972) (free and open competition); S. 978, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. I (1973) (substantial and effective competition); H.R. 4978, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. I
(1975) (no per se rule shall be applied under certain circumstances); and H.R. 5340, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975) (rule of reason applies).
27. H.R. 6684, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1975), for example, specifically precluded the
application of a per se test for bottlers. For a discussion of the per se rule, see notes 59-62
and accompanying text infra.
28. Intrabrand competition in the soft drink industry is competition between bottlers of
the same brand, for example, competition between different Coca-Cola bottlers. Interbrand
competition is competition between bottlers of different brands, for example, competition
between a Coca-Cola bottler and a Pepsi bottler. The legislation would have provided spe-
cial treatment for intrabrand competition only.
29. A typical license between a bottler and the soft drink manufacturer would make the
bottler "sole and exclusive customer and licensee for the purpose of bottling" the trade-
marked syrup. The bottler may not use the trademarked name "nor bottle nor vend said
product except in the territory." See Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. at 517, 521-22. Because
these territorial arrangements are absolute, they are considered "airtight," thus precluding
any intrabrand competition within the territories. See Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust
Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. I, 8-9 (1978). Critics of the
legislation pointed out the severity of the airtight restrictions condoned in the bills and noted
that less restrictive arrangements (such as primary responsibility clauses which require a
dealer to focus his primary efforts on securing a designated area but do not specifically limit
him to that area) might have served the small bottlers'needs for protection equally well. See
Letter from Alan Parker, Assistant Attorney General, H.R. REP. No. 1118, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 11 (1980).
30. Exclusive Territorial and Customer Restrictions: Hearings on H.R. 6684 Before the
Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HR. 6684 Hearings] (statement of Sidney P.
Mudd, President, National Soft Drink Association).
31. Id at 299 (statement of Bruce Wilson, Acting Attorney General). Mr. Wilson re-
ferred to H.R. 6684 as "special interest legislation" and an "exception" to the antitrust laws.
During consideration of soft drink legislation in the 96th Congress, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Alan Parker echoed Mr. Wilson's views, claiming that the legislation "represents an
effort by special interests to remove themselves from the application of antitrust rules
designed to maximize competition and preserve efficiency." H.R. REP. No. 1118, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1980).
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these differing interpretations of the legislation's effect, the measures
prompted considerable controversy, and extensive hearings were held on
the various proposals.
32
In response to what it considered improper FTC complaints against
Pepsico and Coca-Cola, Congress in 1975 considered legislative proposals
to grant relief to the bottlers. While these measures were pending, how-
ever, an FTC Administrative Law Judge dismissed the agency's com-
plaints.33 The judge applied the rule of reason test 34 to the unique facts of
the soft drink industry. He found that, although the territorial restraints
eliminated intrabrand competition,35 the loss to intrabrand competition
was outweighed by the legitimate business purpose that the restrictions
served - focusing bottlers' attention on what the judge described as "in-
tense" interbrand competition.
36
Shortly thereafter, the bottlers received good news when, in Continental
T V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. , the Supreme Court abandoned the per
se approach which the bottlers had been seeking to avoid. Sylvania in-
volved a franchise agreement in which distributors of GTE Sylvania prod-
ucts were barred from selling their products from locations other than
those provided for in the agreement. Instead of the per se analysis, the
Court reinstated the rule of reason test for vertical nonprice restraints and
32. See, e.g., S. 3040 Hearings, supra note 21; H.R. 6684 Hearings, supra note 30; S. 598
Hearings, supra note 13.
33. Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. at 523 (initial decision by Administrative Law Judge Jo-
seph P. Dufresne).
34. Under the Schwinn rule, if the Coca-Cola Co. had parted with dominion over the
syrup, the restraints imposed by Coca-Cola would be considered illegal per se. Because
Coca-Cola had not parted with dominion over its product, the judge held that the Schwinn
rule did not apply. In addition the judge opined that the per se rule of Schwinn was not
intended "to apply to restrictions imposed incidental to the grant of a trademark license such
as the one 'Coca-Cola' and the other national bottlers use." Id at 518. For a discussion of
the rule of reason, see notes 54-56 and accompanying text infra.
35. 91 F.T.C. at 585.
36. Id at 548. In finding "intense" competition, Judge Dufresne was persuaded by the
large numbers of brands available to consumers. An average of 30-50 different types of soft
drinks are generally available in most localities. The judge concluded that "there is intense
competition in the sale of carbonated soft drinks which stems from the fact that there is a
large number of brands available to the consumer in the local market." Id at 548. Exami-
nation of the number of brands alone as a measure of the level of interbrand competition
may be misleading, however, because of the practice of "piggybacking." "Piggybacking in-
volves the production and sale by a bottler of soft drink brands trademarked by two or more
syrup companies. Each syrup company generally grants the bottler an exclusive territory for
its brands." Id at 636. As a result of extensive "piggybacking" in the soft drink industry,
many bottlers are multi-brand bottlers. See Katz, supra note 18, at 266. See also Coca-Cola
Co., 91 F.T.C. at 637.
37. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
1980]
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overruled its holding in United Slates v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 38 In
Schwinn the Court had required the application of a per se test to certain
vertical restraints. 39 Notwithstanding that Sylvania seemed to operate in
the soft drink industry's favor, a subsequent ruling by the Federal Trade
Commission set back the bottlers by mandating a rule of reason test for
industries entering into nonprice vertical arrangements.
In a two-to-one decision, the full Commission vacated the Administra-
tive Law Judge's dismissal of the original complaints and ordered Coca-
Cola and Pepsico to eliminate most of their territorial restraints.4" Apply-
ing Sylvania, the Commission concluded that interbrand competition in
the soft drink industry was not sufficient to outweigh the loss of intrabrand
competition caused by the system of territorial restraints. The Commis-
sion examined the potentially legitimate purposes4' of promoting inter-
brand competition. One of the justifications advanced by Coca-Cola for
limiting intrabrand competition was that territorial exclusivity was neces-
sary to encourage bottlers to invest in local price advertising. Coca-Cola
claimed that, without the territorial arrangements, a local distributor
would be reluctant to spend money on advertising when competing Coca-
Cola distributors in that locality would be "free riders," reaping the bene-
fits of his advertising without paying for it.a: Although the Commission
acknowledged that local price advertising helped stimulate competition, it
38. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). In Schwinn the Court held that in those cases where the re-
straint was imposed by a manufacturer after he had parted with dominion and control, the
restraint was per se illegal.
39. 433 U.S. at 58. In Schwinn the passage of title from the manufacturer to the distrib-
utor was the key factor in determining whether a per se or rule of reason approach was
required. The Sylvania court rejected this distinction, noting that it was "essentially unre-
lated to any relevant economic impact." Id. at 56. "We conclude that the distinction drawn
in Schwinn between sale and nonsale transactions is not sufficient to justify the application
of a per se rule in one situation and a rule of reason in the other." Id at 57.
40. Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. at 675. Under the antitrust laws and rules, the procedure
for FTC review of trade practices begins with an investigation at the staff level. If the staff
issues a complaint, an administrative law judge hears the case and his findings and orders
are subject to review by the full Commission. The Commission's orders are then appealable
directly to a federal court of appeals. 16 C.F.R § 3.1-.72 (1980).
41. The Commission cited Sylvania's justifications for the loss to intrabrand competi-
tion that vertical restraints may cause. The restraints may be justifiable if they "promote
interbrand competition by inducing capital investment and promotional and service activi-
ties by the supplier's customers, by increasing marketing efficiency, and by improving quali-
ty control," the Commission stated. Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. at 626. See Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 54-55. The Court referred to these factors as "re-
deeming virtues." Id. at 54.
42. See Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. at 629-31. For a discussion of the free ride problem,
see Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and its Aftermath,
81 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1432-33 (1968).
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refuted the soft drink industry's use of territories to prevent the "free
rider" problem. 3 The Commission pointed out that, unlike the dealers in
Sylvania, bottlers sell to retailers and not directly to consumers. Thus, the
effectiveness of price advertising would be limited to the suggested retail
price level.
The Commission then considered whether interbrand competition in the
soft drink industry was sufficiently intense to outweigh the absence of in-
trabrand competition. The Commission focused on the practice of "pig-
gybacking"44 which enables a single bottler to bottle and sell more than
one trademarked brand of soft drink. This practice, according to the Com-
mission, tends to increase the concentration of power in the industry
among the few large manufacturers.4 5 Because of "piggybacking," a bot-
tler is able to control pricing and market strategies for several different,
allegedly competing, brands.4 6  The Commission concluded that "pig-
gybacking," coupled with territorial restrictions, shields bottlers from in-
terbrand competition.
Having concluded that the territorial arrangements inhibit both inter-
brand and intrabrand competition, the Commission ordered Coca-Cola to
cease and desist from entering into and maintaining the territorial restric-
tions. 7
While judicial review of this adverse ruling was being pursued, 8 the soft
drink industry continued to seek legislative action exempting its system of
exclusive territorial franchises from unfavorable treatment under the anti-
trust laws. Because Sylvania mandated a rule of reason test for vertical
restraints, there was little reason for bottlers to continue to fear the rigidity
of theper se approach.4 9 Thus, the legislative focus turned to defining how
43. Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. at 630.
44. See note 36 supra.
45. Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. at 638.
46. The Commission illustrated how piggybacking lessens interbrand competition by
quoting a Coca-Cola bottler who decided to piggyback Dr. Pepper: "[W]e would rather
compete with ourselves than have somebody else compete with us." 91 F.T.C. at 637.
47. Id. at 676. The Commission did allow Coca-Cola to continue using territorial ar-
rangements for the sole purpose of distributing soda in returnable bottles. The Commission
concluded that the continued distribution of returnable containers depends on bottlers being
able to identify and recapture the bottles within a given area. For these reasons, the Com-
mission declared it "unnecessary to lift retrictions on the sale of Coca-Cola and allied prod-
ucts in refillable bottles." Id. at 650.
48. Coca-Cola Co. v. FTC, 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978), appeal docketed, Nos. 78-1364, 78-
1544, 78-1545 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 24, 1978).
49. Although the Court rejected the Schwinn per se approach, it did "not foreclose the
possibility that particular applications of vertical restrictions might justify per se prohibi-
tion... " 433 U.S. at 58. See Louis, Vertical Distribution Restraints After Sylvania." A
Postscript and Comment, 76 MIcH. L. REV. 265 (1977). Louis notes that even under Sylva-
1980]
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the rule of reason would apply to the territorial allocations of the soft
drink industry. Following extensive discussion of the rule of reason, a
final bill emerged which allows territorial restraints as long as there is
"substantial and effective" interbrand competition.5" The Act specifies,
however, that its provisions do not legalize traditional per se violations."
A major purpose of the Act is to end the lengthy litigation process which
has overshadowed the soft drink industry by clarifying the application of
the antitrust laws to territorial franchise agreements.52 The Act, however,
provides little guidance to either the courts or the bottlers because of ambi-
guities in the Act and inconsistencies in the legislative history.
III. THE ACT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF REASON AS
APPLIED TO VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
While proponents said the Act attempted to codify the rule of reason,
the Act actually sets forth a new test, requiring "substantial and effective"
interbrand competition. This test varies the traditional rule of reason by
condoning the absence of intrabrand competition caused by exclusive ter-
ritorial arrangements.
Thus, to understand the test created by this statute, it is necessary to
understand the development of the rule of reason and the historical ten-
sion between the rule of reason and the per se test in vertical restraint
situations.
Because the Sherman Act's statutory mandate governing anticompeti-
tive business activity is broad,53 the Supreme Court devised a "rule of rea-
son" test in early antitrust cases.54 Under this test, only those practices
nia, "sellers assigning closed territories to their distributors or dealers will... still be court-
ing trouble .. " Id at 273. See also Pitofsky, supra, for arguments supporting continued
use of the per se approach even after Sylvania.
50. Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act, Pub. L. No. 96-308, § 2, 94 Stat. 939 (1978).
5 1. Id. § 3. The Act does not legalize "price fixing agreements, horizontal restraints of
trade, or group boycotts, if such agreements, restraints, or boycotts would otherwise be un-
lawful." The Act also provides for a four year statute of limitations, rather than the usual
13-year limit under the Clayton Act, by eliminating the tolling provision in § 5 of the Clay-
ton Act.
52. On the day the Senate voted on the Soft Drink lnterbrand Competition Act, Senator
Dole explained that the Act "would obviate the necessity of having many difficult lawsuits
brought before the FTC in order to clarify the application of the Sylvania case's rule of
reason test to the soft drink bottling industry." 126 CONG. REC. S5437, (daily ed. May 15,
1980) (remarks of Sen. Dole).
53. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) makes illegal "[every] contract, combination
. . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce. . ....
54. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). For a discussion of the
rule of reason and its historical development in antitrust law, see National Soc'y of Profes-
sional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-92 (1978).
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determined to be unreasonable restraints of trade violate the Sherman
Act.55 Courts found this test difficult to apply. 6 Responding to this prob-
lem,57 the Supreme Court offered a less complex, alternative analysis: the
per se rule.58 Under this test, courts will find certain practices illegal with-
out analyzing their reasonableness.5 9 Price fixing6° and resale price main-
tenance 6  are examples of restraints of trade that are considered per se
illegal because of their severely detrimental effect on competition. Hori-
zontal restraints are agreements made between competitors at the same
market level. When competitors at the same level of the market agree to
limit or influence trade, all levels of the market are affected. Anticompeti-
tive practices at one level are amplified throughout the market. These hor-
izontal restraints, considered "naked restraints of trade with no purpose
except stifling competition," are therefore treated as illegal per se. 6 2 There
was uncertainty, however, as to whether the per se rule was properly appli-
cable to nonprice vertical restraints. These restraints involve agreements
55. See Comanor, supra note 42, at 1419.
56. But courts often found guidance in the now famous quote by Justice Brandeis:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its con-
dition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its
effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be at-
tained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an
otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent
may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
57. See Comanor, supra note 42, at 1419. See also Bork, The Rule ofReason and the Per
Se Concept.- Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966).
58. Justice Black explained the per se principle in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1 (1958):
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle . . . avoids
the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation
into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an
effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasona-
ble . ..
Id at 5. See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
59. For a discussion of the types of restraints which require per se treatment, see Maher,
On the Path from White to Schwinn to Sylvania to... ?, 82 DICK. L. REV. 433, 443-46 (1978).
60. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940).
61. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). For a
discussion of the per se illegality of vertical price fixing see, Pitofsky, supra note 29.
62. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
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made between persons at different levels of the market structure for the
purpose of advancing their market position, and they generally have a less
destructive impact on competition.63
In White Motor Co. v. United States,64 where exclusive territorial and
customer restraints in the truck manufacturing business were challenged,
the Supreme Court refused to apply the per se rule. Justice Douglas, writ-
ing for the majority, claimed that the Court did not know enough about
the economics of such arrangements to determine whether they had a
"pernicious effect on competition" necessitating per se treatment, or
whether they should be examined within the scope of the more flexible
rule of reason.65
A few years later, however, in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. ,66
the Court was willing to apply a per se rule to certain vertical restraints
imposed by the Schwinn bicycle company. In its distribution plan
Schwinn had allocated exclusive territories to distributors and confined the
distribution of merchandise to franchised dealers.6 7 The Court held that
Schwinn had committed a per se violation of the antitrust laws when it
sought to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom its products
could be traded after Schwinn had parted with dominion and control over
those products.68 Citing the ancient rule against restraints on alienation,
the Court distinguished and upheld those territorial restrictions and
franchising agreements where the manufacturer retained title, dominion,
and risk of the product. 69 The Court's use of a seemingly irrelevant factor,
the distinction between retaining or parting with dominion as a test for
declaring certain vertical restraints illegal per se, prompted extensive criti-
cism from legal and economic commentators.7 °
63. Vertical restrictions are those restrictions which are imposed among companies or
individuals at successive stages of distribution. A common example of vertical restraints is
the agreement made between a manufacturer and a distributor or a dealer. See United
States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); Zelek, Stern & Dunfee, A Rule of
Reason Decision ModelAfter Sylvania, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 13, 15-18 (1980).
64. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
65. Id at 263 (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
66. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
67. Id. at 371.
68. Id. at 379.
69. Id. at 380. Under the common law, courts attempt to promote the alienability of
property by proscribing restraints on alienation. The Schwinn court apparently reasoned
that allowing a manufacturer to exercise control over a product after he has parted with
ownership of that product would restrict that product's transferability and thus violate the
rule against restraints on alienation.
70. See Louis, Vertical Distributional Restraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania: An Argu-
ment for the Continuing Use of a Partial Per Se Approach, 75 MICH. L. REV. 275, 275-76 n.6
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Subsequently, Sylvania7 provided the Court with an opportunity to re-
spond to the criticism of Schwinn72 and to re-examine the soundness of the
per se rule in the context of nonprice vertical restrictions. GTE Sylvania, a
television manufacturer with a relatively insignificant share of the national
market, instituted a franchise plan in which franchisees were limited to
selling Sylvania products only from designated locations.73 The Court re-
jected the Schwinn Court's per se analysis and adopted the rule of reason
to examine Sylvania's location clauses. The Court balanced the slight re-
duction of intrabrand competition caused by the restrictions against the
increase in interbrand competition.74 The Court noted that various effi-
ciencies result from the use of location clauses and similar territorial re-
straints. For example, a manufacturer may use vertical restrictions to
encourage distributors "to engage in promotional activities or to provide
service and repair facilities necessary to the efficient marketing of their
products."75 When a distributor knows that no other distributor in his
area will enjoy a "free ride" on his advertising efforts, he is more likely to
engage vigorously in advertising activities.76 Because of potentially posi-
tive effects7 7 that location agreements may have on stimulating interbrand
competition, the Court could not justify application of the per se classifica-
tion required by Schwinn.7 8 It therefore returned to the rule of reason test
for vertical restrictions.79
Thus, with the holding in Sylvania, the rule of reason became the test for
determining the legality of vertical territorial agreements, including those
in the soft drink industry. Before passage of the Soft Drink Interbrand
Competition Act, therefore, the rule of reason test as expressed in Sylvania
(1976); Maher, supra note 59, at 434; Case Comment, A Rule of Reason for Vertical Re-
straints, 12 VAL. L. REV. 179, 188 (1977).
71. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
72. Id. at 47-49.
73. Id at 38.
74. Id at 54. For a discussion of the balancing test used in Sylvania, see Steuer, Beyond
Sylvania.- Reason Returns to Vertical Restraints, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 1007, 1008 (1978).
75. 433 U.S. 36, 54-55.
76. See Bork, supra note 57, at 430-38. See also notes 42-43 and accompanying text
supra.
77. Justice Powell termed the potentially positive effects of vertical restraints "redeem-
ing virtues" which may justify the otherwise anticompetitive practice. Continental T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 54.
78. Because Sylvania parted with title to its products, the Schwinn rule would have held
the location clauses illegal per se. Id. at 45. The Court specifically overruled Schwinn. Id
at 58.
79. The Court did not attempt to set forth an interpretation of the rule of reason other
than noting the interbrand/intrabrand balancing. The Court referred to Justice Brandeis'
oft-quoted formulation of the rule of reason. ld at 49.
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governed the franchise agreements in the soft drink bottling industry.8°
Whether the territorial restraints would have survived judicial scrutiny
under a Sylvania rule of reason analysis is not certain.8' The issue raised
by the Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act, however, is how the bot-
tlers' distribution will fare under the "substantial and effective competi-
tion" test. Unfortunately, the congressional mandate is not altogether
clear.82
The Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act purports simply to codify
the Sylvania decision.83 However, the standard of legality described by
reports of both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees modify Sylva-
nia's rule of reason for the soft drink industry by virtually removing from
consideration the degree of intrabrand competition in the industry. In-
stead, the factors to be considered in determining if there is "substantial
and effective competition with other products of the same general class in
the relevant market or markets" are set forth by the Committees.84 The
80. In Tomac, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 418 F. Supp. 359 (C.D. Cal. 1976), the court ap-
plied the rule of reason test to uphold the territorial allocations of Coca-Cola bottlers in
California, even before the Supreme Court ruled in Sylvania. See also First Beverages, Inc.
v. Royal Crown Cola Co., 612 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir. 1980). The court in First Beverages up-
held the lower court's instruction to the jury that the rule of reason be applied in judging the
legality of Royal Crown's exclusive territorial restraints. Id at 1170-71.
81. See First Beverages, Inc. v. Royal Crown Cola Co., 612 F.2d 1164, 1170-71 (9th Cir.
1980) (court upheld trial court's finding that Royal Crown's territorial arrangement was
valid under rule of reason analysis).
82. See, e.g., Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act: Hearings on HR. 3567 Before the
Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979) (testimony of Richard Favretto, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral). An initial difficulty encountered in interpreting the legislative intent of the Act is that
the House Judiciary Committee report is itself ambiguous - with dissenting views by three
members, additional views by thirteen members, and two supplemental views each signed
by one member. H.R. REP. No. 1118, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The additional views
signed by 13 members attempt to clarify the purpose of the bill. It provides, however, that to
the extent that the additional views differ from the report's other views, the 13 members
intend their views to be controlling. Further, the House report discusses the amended bill
which became law while the Senate report comments on the original, slightly different, ver-
sion of the legislation. The amendments to the original H.R. 3567 are discussed in H.R.
REP. No. 1118, at 18, and are also described by the author of the revisions, Congressman
Butler, in 126 CONG. REC. H5541-42 (daily ed. June 24, 1980). The Senate concurred with
the House amendments and therefore no conference committee convened to discuss and
resolve the differences between the two bills.
83. But see S598 Hearings, supra note 13, at 211 (testimony of Eleanor Fox): "I believe
the Bill is intended to be much more receptive to the restraint than is Sylvania."
84. S. REP. No. 645, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1979); H.R. REP. No. 1118,96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5-6 (1980). Senators Metzenbaum and Kennedy question whether any genuine in-
quiry is intended or whether the language of the bill reflects an automatic judgment that the
territorial restraints do promote substantial and effective interbrand competition. See S.
REP. No. 645, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1980) (minority views). See also S. 598 Hearings,
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factors for consideration under a substantial and effective competition test
focus on the components of interbrand competition, including:
the number of brands and types of flavors of available soft
drinks; the persistence of long-run anticompetitive profits; the
number of retail price options available to consumers; the exist-
ence of inefficiency and waste; the degree of service; ease of entry
into the market; the number and strength of sellers of directly
competing products in a relevant market; and the availability of
various forms of containers or packaging.85
These factors are useful indicia in determining interbrand competition, but
they do not require consideration of competition among bottlers of the
same brand. Only if interbrand competition is shown to be insubstantial
will an inquiry into intrabrand competition become necessary.8 6 In con-
trast, the rule of reason discussed in Sylvania and prior cases requires con-
sideration of "all of the circumstances of a case," 87 including both the
intrabrand harm and the interbrand benefit.88 In Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of
America,89 a post-Sylvania case involving the legality of territorial re-
straints imposed by Sony, the court applied the rule of reason test by ex-
amining the effect that the territorial allocations had on both intrabrand
and interbrand competition. The Sony distribution scheme in question
was enforced through a system of warranty fees through which the dealer
in territory A, for example, would be able to detect whether the dealer in
neighboring territory B or C was selling in territory .4.90 The court noted
that this territorial distribution system operated to eliminate intrabrand
competition altogether. Further, the court found significant the fact that
Sony's standing in the relevant market was high, Sony being "one of the
supra note 13, at 207 (statement of Eleanor Fox): "I am concerned that the bill may be
construed to reflect legislative factfinding, right here and now, of substantial and effective
competition." See also H.R. REP. No. 1118, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1980) (additional
views) ("[T]he industry currently meets the competitive standards of the bill.")
85. H.R. REP. No. 1118, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980).
86. Id at 18 (additional views). But see the remarks of Rep. McClory, 126 CONG. REC.,
H5538 (daily ed. June 24, 1980). Rep. McClory explained the bill as requiring consideration
of all relevant factors, including intrabrand competition. Although Rep. McClory con-
tended that "substantial and effective" intrabrand competition imports a higher than usual
standard, others pointed out that similar standards had been interpreted broadly in favor of
industries. See S. REP. No. 645, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23 (minority views). See also S. 598
Hearings, supra note 13, at 140-41 (statement of Richard Favretto).
87. 433 U.S. at 49.
88. See, e.g., First Beverages, Inc. v. Royal Crown Cola Co., 612 F.2d at 1170 n.8 (9th
Cir. 1980).
89. 459 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
90. Id. at 1283.
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principal sellers dominating an oligopolistic market."'" In light of the
damage to intrabrand competition and Sony's high market share, the court
held the territorial restraints to be illegal.92
In another post-Sylvania case, Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire
Corp. ,93 the court upheld the vertical restriction but applied a similarly
thorough test of reasonableness. The dealer sales agreement in Rice con-
tained a location clause and also prohibited dealers from selling wholesale
to other unauthorized dealers. The court began its analysis by noting that
Sylvania demanded an examination of "[tihe economic rationales underly-
ing these restraints as well as the evidence presented concerning actual
competitive consequences. . .. "9 The court found that the restraints
were reasonably necessary for Michelin to eliminate the free rider advertis-
ing problem and to ensure that specialized services be provided.
The court did not, however, conclude its analysis at this point. It pro-
ceeded to scrutinize the detrimental effect that the restraints had on in-
trabrand competition, noting that "the rule of reason standard requires an
assessment of the potential detriment to intrabrand competition of the
challenged restraints." '95 The court found that Michelin had in fact taken
steps to increase intrabrand competition by increasing the number of out-
lets and dismantling the geographic allocation system. Because the re-
straints were reasonably necessary to meet interbrand competition, and
because they did not adversely effect intrabrand competition, the court
found them to be valid under the antitrust laws.
Unlike the courts in Eiberger and Rice, a court applying the Soft Drink
Interbrand Competition Act will not consider the loss to intrabrand com-
petition in light of market share standing and other relevant factors. Only
after interbrand competition is shown to be insignificant will there be any
discussion of intrabrand competition.
The Act's departure from the Sylvania rule of reason test is further ap-
parent in congressional criticism of the Commission Opinion by the FTC
in the Coca-Cola and Pepsico cases. In those cases, the Commission pur-
ported to follow Sylvania's mandate under the rule of reason, but propo-
nents of the legislation claimed that the Commission had unduly relied on
91. Id at 1284. The Court determined that Sony's market share in the relevant market
(dictation equipment) was over 12%. Id. at 1283.
92. "The damage to intrabrand competition far outweighs any benefits which may have
accrued to interbrand competition as a result of the program." Id at 1284.
93. 483 F. Supp. 750 (D. Md. 1980).
94. Id at 753.
95. Id. at 760.
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the loss to intrabrand competition caused by the territorial restrictions96
without adequate consideration of the interbrand competition in the indus-
try.97 The Commission, rightly or wrongly, did specifically conclude that
competition among competing brands of soft drinks had been seriously
impaired by the vertical restraints.98 Congress, however, has implied a
contrary conclusion and has devised a standard of legality under which it
expects the territorial restrictions to be upheld. 99 Further, the legislative
standard ignores the caveat in Sylvania'00 that some vertical restraints still
require per se scrutiny.'O'
Although the Court specifically rejected Schwinn's reliance on parting
with dominion as determinative of the applicability of a per se rule, the
Court allowed for application of a per se rule when warranted by "demon-
strable economic effect."'° 2 This reservation echoes the early cases which
explained the need for a per se rule where the effect of the restraint on
competition was highly detrimental. As discussed earlier, 10 3 courts have
categorized as illegal per se those practices that greatly restrict competition
with little or no redeeming value to the economy.
Some of the characteristics which may, even under Sylvania, subject a
particular restraint to per se scrutiny, such as high concentration and high
level of product differentiation,'04 can be found in the soft drink industry.
96. For example, one congressman during House consideration of the Act stated that
"the FTC's preoccupation with intrabrand competition has always been ill-advised." 126
CONG. REC. H5536 (daily ed. June 24, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Hall). See S. REP. No. 645,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980).
97. In view of some of the oligopolistic characteristics of the soft drink industry, the
Commission's conclusion that there is little interbrand competition is not necessarily incor-
rect. See Katz, supra note 18; Mongoven, supra note 15; Mueller, Franchising and the Anti-
trust Laws.- The "Territorial" Problem, 9 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 59, 71 (1977).
98. Coca-Cola Co., 91 FTC at 640.
99. The additional views contained in the House Judiciary Committee report suggest
that the majority of the committee members believe that the industry's practices already
meet the test of competition in the Act. See H.R. REP. No. 1118, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18
(1980) (additional views).
100. See 433 U.S. at 58. See note 49 supra.
101. See Zelek, Stern & Dunfee, supra note 63, at 68. Even after Sylvania, a test of
presumptive illegality under which certain restraints, while not considered illegal per se, are
presumed illegal, may be appropriate. The authors contend that this test of presumptive
illegality is applicable "if concentration, product differentiation, and entry barriers in the
relevant market are all high . . .[and] [m]ore specifically, if the concentration level is such
that four firms command fifty percent of the relevant market . . .[and] the defendant sup-
plier is one of the four largest firms." Id. at 34. The soft drink industry may fit into this test
for presumptive illegality. See Steuer, supra note 74, at 1012, for a discussion of the possible
development of a presumptive illegality test.
102. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 58-59.
103. See notes 57-61 supra.
104. In his concurring opinion in Sylvania, Justice White explains why he would not
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First, as has been previously indicated,' °5 four major soft drink companies
control a sizable share of nationwide sales.' 06 Thus, the nature of the com-
panies benefiting from the restraints here differs significantly from the
company seeking protection in Sylvania. GTE Sylvania was a small com-
pany seeking to establish a position in a highly competitive business,
whereas Coca-Cola and Pepsico cannot be characterized as small firms
seeking to enter the market."'0 Further, each of the four major firms issues
franchises for several different flavors and brands of soft drinks. As a re-
sult, even though there may be over 100 different brands 10 8 of carbonated
soft drinks in a particular area, a large percentage of these brands are man-
ufactured by Coca-Cola, Pepsico, Dr. Pepper, or Seven Up.
Second, substantial product differentiation exists in the soft drink mar-
ket:' 09 that is, consumers have a strongly established preference for a par-
ticular brand of soda." 0  Extensive advertising in the industry has
effectively given certain soft drinks a unique identity so that consumers
consistently buy a favorite brand of beverage rather than even consider
substituting any competing brands."' In markets where the level of prod-
uct differentiation is substantial, interbrand competition tends to be less
intense and any other restraints on competition may be suspect.'2
Finally, the territorial restraints themselves may be of questionable util-
ity in light of changes in transportation modes and population patterns.
For this reason some economic commentators have labeled the industry as
inefficient.' Thus, the very efficiency and flexibility which the antitrust
laws are designed to promote may be undermined by statutorily sanction-
ing a possibly outdated and inefficient distribution system.
Application of the statute's test may require consideration of these fac-
have overruled Schwinn. He contends that the rule of reason should be applied to vertical
restraint situations where there is a high degree of interchangeability of products and where
the manufacturer benefitting from the absence of intrabrand competition is a new or falter-
ing firm. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 65. Presumably Justice
White would be more reluctant to sanction the absence of intrabrand competition in cases
where there was a lack of product substitutes and a manufacturer with a high market share
was involved.
105. See note 15 supra.
106. Because four firms control more than half of nationwide sales, the industry has been
characterized as oligopolistic. See Zelek, Stern & Dunfee, supra note 63, at 13.
107. See Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. at 626.
108. See, e.g., S. 598 Hearings, supra note 13, at 13.
109. See Mongoven, supra note 15, at 93.
110. See Mueller, supra note 97, at 70-71.
11. See Mongoven, supra note 15, at 99. See also Zelek, Stern & Dunfee, supra note 63,
at 33.
112. See Zelek, Stern & Dunfee, supra note 63.
113. See Katz, supra note 18, at 263.
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tors in determining whether interbrand competition is substantial and ef-
fective. The legislative history does suggest that the courts should consider
a number of the components of interbrand competition, such as the
number of brands and flavors and the degree of inefficiency." 4 But be-
cause the statute contemplates examination of the importance of in-
trabrand competition only after a court finds inadequate interbrand
competition, there is a danger that the rule of reason's careful balancing
and analysis of "all relevant factors" will be replaced by a less thorough
test.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act was purportedly enacted to
codify the rule of reason and, thus, to remove the question of the legality
of the soft drink industry's territorial arrangements from the courts. But
Congress' "substantial and effective competition" test actually alters the
rule of reason by essentially removing intrabrand competition from the
factors for determining the reasonableness of a restraint. The present stat-
utory test is ambiguous and confuses, rather than clarifies, an already diffi-
cult area of the law.
If Congress truly intended to ensure that the rule of reason would be
applied to territorial agreements in the soft drink industry, it could have
easily left the question to the courts which, following Sylvania, are now
required to apply the rule of reason to vertical agreements. Even if the
FTC applied the rule of reason incorrectly, as some members of Congress
contend it had, the soft drink industry still had recourse to the United
States Court of Appeals, where the case is still pending. In light of the
legislation, however, the FTC has asked the Court of Appeals to set aside
the Coca-Cola case and remand it to the FTC for dismissal. This action
would effectively preclude a review of the industry under a rule of reason
test. Were it not for the Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit would be bound by the
rule of reason as articulated by Sylvania. Under this test, the soft drink
industry's practice would have been scrutinized both as to the interbrand
benefit and the intrabrand harm resulting from the restraints.
Now, however, even if it continues consideration of the case, the Court
of Appeals will be bound by the more limited "substantial and effective
competition" test under which the components of interbrand competition
are key. If the court looks for guidance to define "substantial and effective
competition," however, it will find that Congress' expressed intent is incon-
114. H.R. REP. No. 1118, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980).
1980]
Catholic University Law Review
sistent with the new test. Under the rule of reason which the Act attempts
to embody, all relevant factors, including intrabrand competition, the busi-
ness' relevant market share, and the degree of product differentiation
would be examined. In light of the oligopolistic nature of the soft drink
industry and the extent of product differentiation, the territorial restraints,
which totally eliminate intrabrand competition, may be questionable
under a rule of reason analysis. Congress, however, presumed that inter-
brand competition in the soft drink industry is vigorous and should be
enough alone to remove the industry from further scrutiny. The rule of
reason offers a more flexible approach to the difficult antitrust analysis and
it should not be abandoned in favor of a more narrow review. By narrow-
ing the focus of the rule of reason, Congress has set forth a test approxi-
mating presumptive legality in the soft drink industry. Congress expects
the soft drink territorial arrangements to be upheld under the new Act.
This special treatment for one industry confuses existing law and may set a
bad precedent for future cases. It is unfortunate that Congress has re-
moved the opportunity for a full and thorough rule of reason analysis of
the soft drink industry's exclusive territorial allocations.
Agnes Pek Dover
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